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I. INTRODUCTION
Unsolicited commercial electronic mail, or spam,1 has been at the
center of controversy.2 If you use the Internet, you have almost certainly
received spam; chances are good that you are being bombarded with
unsolicited commercial electronic mail.' If you are one of the lucky few
that have not received unsolicited commercial electronic mail, it is likely
that you will receive spam as you continue to use the Internet.4 The
magnitude and scale of the unsolicited commercial electronic mail
problem are so great that they stretch the imagination. At any given
time, up to thirty percent of all electronic mails sent in cyberspace is
spam.5 Even a conservative estimate, pegging spare electronic mail at
1. See Send Your Junk E-Mail to New Web Site, STAR TRIB., June 3, 1999, at 13E.
According to Net lore, a sketch from the British comedy troupe Monty
Python's Flying Circus was the inspiration for the spam nickname. In a diner,
a frustrated couple tries in vain to order a dish that doesn't include Hormel's
canned, chopped, jellied pork shoulder. As the waitress rattles off the day's
menu, "Spam, egg, Spam and sausage," a group of Vikings at the next table
sings, "Spam, Spam, Spam, lovely Spam!" eventually drowning out everyone
else.
Id.
2. There is even a controversy over the name spam. Hormel Foods Corporation,
the maker of the canned food "SPAM" has threatened Cyber Promotion, Inc., an
unsolicited electronic mail provider, with a lawsuit if it does not stop using the term"spam" in referring to its bulk electronic mail business. See Hormel Objects to Cyber
Promotions' Use of 'SPAM' Mark, ANDREwS COMPUTER & ONLINE INDUS. Lmo. REP.
24432, July 15, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL Database Allnewsplus; see also David
Bloom, Digital L.A. 2 Faces of Spam: For Some, It's Lunch Meat in a Can; Others Only
See Junk E-mail Pain, L.A. DAILY NEws, Sept. 12, 1998, available in 1998 WL
3869261.
The SPAM folks also take time to explain their position on SPAM vs. spam,
also known as unsolicited commercial e-mail or UCE. "We do not object to
use of this slang term to describe UCE, although we do object to the use of our
product image in association with that term. Also, if the term is to be used, it
should be used in all lower-case letters to distinguish it from our trademark
SPAM, which should be used with all upper-case letters."
Id.
3. See GartnerGroup Benchmarks the State of Spam in Largest Ever Survey of
Internet Email Users; Reveals that Email Users Expect Greater Spam Protection from
ISPs, Bus. WIRE, June 14, 1999, available in 1999 WL Database Allnewsplus
[hereinafter GartnerGroup Benchmarks the State of Spare] ("Among the survey's finding
was that over 90 percent of [Interet) users receive spam at least once a week and almost
50 percent get spaimed six or more times per week.").
4. See Elizabeth Weise, Feeling Spammed? Internet Users Get Deluged by More
Junk E-Mail, DETROIT NEws, Aug. 5, 1999, at C3 ("And the longer you have your e-mail
address, the higher the probability you will get spammed-from 63 percent at two
months to 96 percent for those online four years or more.").
5. See Court Ruling on Junk E-Mail is Good News for Computer Users, BUFF.
NEws, Jan. 10, 1999, at H2 ("By some estimates, as much as 30% of all e-mail is spam,
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only ten percent of total electronic mail sent daily, translates to 220
million unsolicited commercial electronic mails a day.6 Even assuming
that Internet use will not increase in the future,7 such an estimate
translates to 80.3 trillion unsolicited commercial electronic mails sent
each year.
Although we are used to receiving traditional paper 'junk" mail,
unsolicited commercial electronic mail seems to strike an especially
negative chord with the American people.8 This is reasonable given that
spam is different from traditional junk mail in at least three ways. First,
the content of the vast majority of spam is in poor taste or outright
fraudulent.9  Second, the monetary cost of receiving unsolicited
commercial electronic mails is generally borne by the recipient.' Third,
and the spammers are getting more sophisticated."); see also Margie Wylie, Get Even
With Spammers- Trade Your Junk E-Mail for Discount at Online Store, GRAND RAPIDS
PRESS, May 26, 1999 ("'You've got mail!' should be 'You've got spam!' The world's
largest Internet service provider, AOL reports that unsolicited commercial pitches
account for up to 30 percent of its total e-mail load.").
6. Of the 2.2 billion electronic messages sent daily, some analysts think that 10%
or 220 million messages are spam. See Michael Stroh, Spam is Still the Biggest Irritant
of E-Mail, BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 30, 1999, at E8.
7. This assumption is not accurate given the huge projected growth in Internet
use. See North America is the Leading Region for Internet Users According to the
Computer Industry Almanac, P.R. NEVswIRE, Aug. 17, 1999, available in LEXIS, Wire
Service Stories [hereinafter North America is the Leading Region].
8. The top three reasons that consumers cited for disliking spam are the waste of
time, the invasion of privacy, and the offensive nature of the content. See Weise, supra
note 4.
9. See Dawn Kopecki, FTC Hit with 200,000 Pieces of Spain: Hype for House
Bill, Dow JONES NEwS SERV., July 22, 1999, available in 1999 WL Database
Allnewsplus.
Much of the content of the "Spam Database Analysis" [of 200,000 randomly
selected e-mails] was not fit for public publication, with many e-mails
descriptive enough to make Monica Lewinsky blush and to make the Starr
Report seem like a yawn.
That study found that more than 30% of the 200,000 unsolicited e-mails
analyzed were pornographic, another 30% were "dubious money-making
proposals." Other direct marketed products made up another 24% of the total
unsolicited e-mail the group collected.
Health cures, weight loss and Viagra sales or substitutes made up another
10% of the spam on the Internet.
Id.
10. Two dollars, or about 10%, of access fees charged by Internet service
providers is used to mitigate the impact of spam, either through network expansion or
with anti-spam software. See Wylie, supra note 5. Some consumers may have to pay
more directly. For example, America Online customers on the $4.95 plan get three hours
of monthly Internet access. Each additional hour costs an additional $2.50. See America
Online, AOL Pricing Plans (visited Jan. 19, 2000) <http://www.aol.com/info/pricing.
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unsolicited commercial electronic mails have been known to carry
dangerous viruses that can damage the recipient's computer."
The compounded economic loss of productivity in sorting, reading,
and deleting spam is not trivial or lost on the general public.12 It is no
wonder that people and businesses have turned to self-help, the courts,
and the legislature to combat the spread of spam.
This Comment will examine the law governing unsolicited
commercial electronic mail in California. Part II details the growth of
the Internet and unsolicited commercial electronic mail. Part III
examines the law of trespass to chattel as applied to unsolicited
commercial electronic mail in California. Part IV examines recent
legislative efforts to regulate spam in California. Part V analyzes the
implications of the new unsolicited electronic mail legislation in
California. Finally, Part VI details some suggested revisions to the
California statute dealing with unsolicited commercial electronic mail.
II. THE GROWTH OF THE INTERNET AND UNSOLICITED
COMMERCIAL E-MAIL
The U.S. Defense Department created the Internet over two decades
ago for academic and military use.3 Initially, very few people had
access to the sophisticated computer equipment required to access the
Internet. With relatively few users, there were few problems with
unsolicited commercial electronic mail. However, as prices for
equipment dropped significantly, more people began to access the
Internet. Internet service providers emerged to provide easy access to
millions of customers.
The growth of the Internet spurred the growth of unsolicited
commercial electronic mails. In the beginning, self-governance was
effective in deterring unsolicited commercial electronic mail' As more
html>.
11. Unsolicited commercial e-mails may carry computer viruses. See Doug
Bedell, Smashing Spain: Internet Coalition Pushing for Federal Law to Stop Electronic
Quick-Buck Artists, DALLAS MORNiNG NEws, July 13, 1999, at iF.
12. See Jeanette Brown, The Mess Made for Business by Junk E-Mail, Bus. WEEK,
Apr. 19, 1999, at 146D.
Employees spend, on average, 30 minutes a day sifting through their deluge
of E-mail. Spam-mail-unsolicited messages from unknown senders-can
cost a 5,000-person organization more than $12,000 per day to process.
That's 50 cents per employee, to check and delete junk-mail messages.
Id.
13. See Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Battle for the Sole of the Internet, TIME, July 25,
1994, at 50, 52. Initially, only universities and the government had the ability to access
the Internet. See id.
14. See id. at 53.
15. See Joshua A. Marcus, Note, Commercial Speech on the Internet: Spam and
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and more people began logging onto the Internet, a series of norms and
rules called "Netiquette" emerged and was commonly followed.'6
However, as technology improved and commercial entities started to
provide access to the general public, the sheer number of Internet users
made Netiquette impracticable since many newcomers did not know the
rules or ignored them.17 The commercialization of the Internet combined
with a cheap and easy form of advertising proved too tempting for
opportunistic Internet users to ignore Netiquette. 1t Currently, there are
over 83 million adults in North America alone that use the Internet on a
weekly basis, with the number expected to grow rapidly.9
Consumers and the Internet service providers have not welcomed the
increase in unsolicited commercial electronic mail. Many consumers
believe that their Internet service providers are sending the junk
electronic mail directly or indirectly through the sale of their Internet
address. 20 The customer satisfaction rates of Internet service providers
have gone down significantly as more and more customers are deluged
with unsolicited commercial electronic mails
21
Consumers have also responded to unsolicited commercial electronic
mail by requesting that senders take their respective addresses off of the
particular mailing list.2 Such requests have generally been ineffective. 23
In fact, such replies to unsolicited commercial electronic mail businesses
the First Amendment, 16 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 245, 246-47 (1998).
16. These rules generally barred sending unsolicited commercial electronic mail.
See id.
17. See id. at 247.
18. See Kopecki, supra note 9 (quoting Rep. Rush Holt, D-N.J., as stating that, "It
costs very little to send out millions of e-mails and whatever return you get is gravy.").
19. Number of adult Internet users, in thousands (add 15% to 30% to account for
occasional Internet users):
1995 1998 2000 2005
Worldwide 39,479 150,887 318,650 717,083
North America 26,217 82,989 148,730 229,780
North America is the Leading Region, supra note 7.
20. Twenty-four percent of respondents in a survey thought that their ISPs
provided spammers with their electronic mall address. See GartnerGroup Benchmarks
the State of Spam, supra note 3.
21. See id.
22. There is even a service that will generate a "strongly worded reply" demanding
that the spammers "cease or pay the recipient $10 for each further mailing." Bedell,
supra note 11.
23. See K.K. Campbell, Waging War on Internet Spammers, TORONTO STAR, Aug.
26, 1999, at L5.
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will likely backfire and increase the total number of spam sent to one's
electronic mail address.24 Even worse, the spammer may be counting on
replies as part of a larger scam. In one case, the unsolicited commercial
electronic mail came with a telephone number and instructions on how
to be removed from the mailing list." Unfortunately, people who called
to be removed from the list "ended up making an international call to the
island of Grenada."26  Since the problem of unsolicited commercial
electronic mail generally increases with time, consumers have resorted
to canceling their old accounts and opening brand new accounts just to
avoid receiving the increased volume of electronic mail.7 Even a new
electronic mail address provides only a short-term solution since the new
electronic mail address is still vulnerable to unsolicited commercial
electronic mail.'
Internet service providers have responded to unsolicited commercial
electronic mail with self-help. Internet service providers and spammers
are constantly playing a game of cyber "cat and mouse" to defend or
penetrate the network of Internet service providers. One tactic of
Internet service providers is to collect all the junk electronic mails from
a spammer and send them back to the spammer as an electronic "email
bomb., 29 The purpose of these electronic mail bombs is to overwhelm
and thus disable the spanming party's own network.30 Internet service
providers have also responded to spamming by transmitting harmful
signals back to the spammer.3' Ordinarily, network computers send
occasional "ping" signals to check the connection. 2 However, Internet
service providers have used mass quantities of signals, or "ping attacks,"
24. See Bedell, supra note 11 ("Replying to spamners is often counterproductive,
Mr. Oxman of Choose Your Mail warns. Asking to be removed from a spam list may
only exacerbate the problem by confirming that yours is a 'live' address."); Campbell,
supra note 23 ("Don't respond [to spam]! Don't ask them to 'take you off a list.' People
who respond--even negatively-are viewed as Grade A targets. You will probably get
more junk than ever.").
25. See Campbell, supra note 23.
26. Id.
27. See GartnerGroup Benchmarks the State of Spare, supra note 3 ("The poll [of
Internet users) shows that email users are not only annoyed by spain, but that many have
and will do something about it by changing their ISP (Internet Service Provider) in order
to reduce or eliminate it.").
28. Even if Internet users do all they can to protect their electronic mail addresses,
they may still receive spam. Spammers use computer programs that randomly generate
e-mail addresses. Therefore, never disclosing one's electronic mail address does not
mean that one will never get spare. See Bedell, supra note 11.
29. Mark D. Robins, Electronic Trespass: An Old Theory in a New Context, 15
COMPUTER L., July 1998, at 1, 4 (1998) (citing Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America
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to overwhelm and disable the network of the offending party.33 In order
to avoid such attacks, spammers have employed "spoofing" techniques
to camouflage their origin or to make it appear as if their true origin is
elsewhere. 4
Internet service providers are also employing new and sophisticated
computer software to prevent outbreaks of unsolicited commercial
electronic mail.35 There is also software available to the general public
to screen out unsolicited commercial electronic mail.36 Such software
also reduces the enormous economic harm that spamming can cause to a
computer system.37 There is evidence that these new software programs
have had some success in reducing spam.38  However, some
commentators have raised concerns regarding the right of privacy with
these new software programs designed to detect spain activity.39 In some
situations, Internet service providers have resorted to reading an
individual's mail in order to determine if such mail is unsolicited
commercial electronic mail.' °
Unsolicited commercial electronic mail has had a negative impact on
both the users and Internet service providers. Consumers subsidize the
cost of receiving unwanted electronic mail. 4' For the Internet service
provider, the cost can be measured in the dollars and resources spent to
deal with unsolicited commercial electronic mail.42 Aside from the
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Jeff Partyka, AT&T WorldNet to Use Brightmail Anti-Spam, INFoWoRLD
DAiLY Naws, Aug. 26, 1999, available in 1999 WL 10504704 (quoting Jeff Magill, Vice
President of Marketing at Brightmail, "As soon as one of those e-mail accounts receives
a piece of [spam] e-mail, it's transmitted to the BLOC, which is staffed 24 hours a day,
seven days a week by spam masters .... Once it finds a piece of suspected spam, the
BLOC staff updates each user's 'spamn wall' to keep out the latest outbreaks.").
36. For example, Microsoft Explorer 4 and 5 are set up to use a program called
Outlook 97. Outlook 97 has a built in filter that can screen out potential spain by looking
at key words. See Bedell, supra note 11.
37. The cost of receiving spam can be 10% of the access fee. See Wylie, supra
note 5.
38. See Bedell, supra note 11 (quoting Ian Oxman, President of Choose Your
Mail, as saying, 'We'll be bringing 200,000 [unsolicited e-mail] messages sent from all
over .... And we're finding over half of the stuff is unique, which is really kind of
frightening.").
39. See generally Steven Miller, Comment, Washington's "Spam Killing" Statute:
Does It Slaughter Privacy in the Process?, 74 WASH. L. REv. 453 (1999) (arguing that
"existing privacy laws fail to provide meaningful protection to e-mail subscribers").
40. See id. at 453.
41. See Campbell, supra note 23; see also America Online, supra note 10.
42. About 10% of revenues are used to combat spam. See Wylie, supra note 5.
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dollars spent, unsolicited commercial electronic mail has been highly
disruptive to Internet service providers. Networks have experienced
delays or have entirely shut down because they have been overwhelmed
with unsolicited commercial electronic mail 3
Ill. USING CALIFORNIA COMMON LAW OF TRESPASS TO CHATTELS
The explosive growth of unsolicited commercial electronic mail and
the lack of legislation concerning spain have forced the Internet service
providers to turn to the courts for relief. Internet service providers have
relied on a cause of action based on trespass to chattel to stop spammers,
and at least a few courts have been receptive to the arguments asserted
by the Internet service providers."4
The cause of action for trespass to chattels is based on common law.45
California courts adopted the theory of trespass to chattel by citing the
works of Professor Prosser and the Restatement of Torts.46 In Zaslow v.
Kroenert,47 the California Supreme Court found that intentionally
placing another person's personal property in storage without asserting
ownership did not amount to substantial interference to the extent
necessary to amount to a conversion.48  However, in finding for the
plaintiff, the court cited Professor Prosser and ruled that "[w]here the
conduct complained of does not amount to a substantial interference
with possession or the right thereto, but consists of intermeddling with
or use of or damages to the personal property, the owner has a cause of
43. See David A. Price, Net Heads Are Fed Up with 'Spam', INV. Bus. DAILY,
Aug. 1, 1997, available in 1997 WL 10709799. "For 18 hours, Internet service provider
Concentric Network Corp. couldn't deliver e-mail to its members. Five CompuServe
Corp. mail servers were knocked out of commission, delaying e-mail delivery for two
hours. A university mail server was shut down in May... [due to] millions of
[unsolicited commercial] e-mail.., messages." Id.
44. See CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1028 (S.D.
Ohio 1997); see also America Online, Inc. v. Greatdeals.net, 49 F. Supp 2d. 851, 853
(E.D. Va. 1999).
45. See Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468,473 (Ct. App. 1996).
Trespass to chattel, although seldom employed as a tort theory in California
(indeed, there is nary a mention of the tort in Witkin's Summary of California
Law), lies where an intentional interference with the possession of personal
property has proximately caused injury. Prosser notes trespass to chattel
has evolved considerably from its original common law application ....
[A]ccording to Prosser, ".... there may be recovery.., for interferences with
the possession of chattels which are not sufficiently important to be classed as
conversion, and so to compel the defendant to pay the full value of the thing
with which he has interfered. Trespass to chattels survives today, in other
words, largely as a little brother of conversion."
Id. (citation omitted).
46. See id.
47. 176 P.2d I (Cal. 1946).
48. See id. at 7.
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action for trespass or case, and may recover only the actual damages
suffered by reason of the impairment of the property or the loss of its
use.' 49 Because the California Supreme Court relied on the Restatement
of Torts to form the common law cause of action for trespass to chattels,
the Restatement should be persuasive authority in analyzing trespass to
chattels in California.
"Chattel' is defined as "[a]n article of personal property, as
distinguished from real property" and "may refer to animate as well as
inanimate property." 0 The Restatement of Torts states that trespass to a
chattel can occur by either "(a) dispossessing another of the chattel, or
(b) using or intermeddling with a chattel in the possession of another."5'
These two types of trespass to chattel place different burdens on the
plaintiff to recover damages. If the trespass to the chattel is a
dispossession, an "action will lie although there has been no impairment
of the condition, quality, or value of the chattel, and no other harm to
any interest of the possessor."52 However, in an action for intermeddling
with the chattel of another without the other's consent, the intermeddling
"must be for a time so substantial that it is possible to estimate the loss
caused thereby." '53
Of these two types of trespass to chattel, the former does not apply to
spamming. Dispossession is defined as an "ouster" or "[a]n act whereby
the wrongdoer gets the actual occupation of the land or hereditament."
'
In a typical spanming incident, the offending party does not actually
dispossess the Internet service providers of their network.5 5 However,
the act of spamming does intermeddle with the possessory interest in a
49. Id.
50. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 236 (6th ed. 1990).
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 217 (1965).
52. Id. § 218 cmt. d.
53. Id. cmt. i.
54. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 471 (6th ed. 1990); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 221 (1965). The Restatement states that:
A dispossession may be committed by intentionally
(a) taking a chattel from the possession of another without the other's
consent, or
(b) obtaining possession of a chattel from another by fraud or duress, or
(c) barring the possessor's access to a chattel, or
(d) destroying a chattel while it is in another's possession, or
(e) taking the chattel into the custody of the law.
Id.
55. Although the spammer may cause Internet service providers considerable
damage and delay, the spammer never assumes actual control of the provider's facilities
or network. See generally Price, supra note 43.
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chattel of the Internet service providers through the unauthorized use of
the possessor's network.
In Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek,56 the California Court of Appeal held
that the defendant's intermeddling with the plaintiff's computer network
by unauthorized electronic signals was sufficient to maintain an action
for trespass to chattels.' 7 In Thrifty-Tel, hackers used computers to get
the unauthorized access codes of a telephone company to make free long
distance telephone calls. 8 The defendants argued that trespass required
a physical touching of another's chattel or entry onto another's land. 9
Although the court recognized that the early common law rule required
physical touching, the court stated that "the electronic signals generated
by the Bezenek boys' activities were sufficiently tangible to support a
trespass cause of action."' Therefore, in California, unauthorized
intermeddling with a computer network by electronic signals can result
in liability based on a cause of action for trespass to chattel.
In determining damages for trespass to chattel by electronic signals,
the Thrifty-Tel court held that the plaintiff must produce reasonably
certain evidence of actual damages caused by the specific intermeddling
incident.' In that case, the plaintiff did not produce any specific
evidence of actual damages caused by the defendants' intermeddling.2
The plaintiff only produced evidence of hours expended in tracking
down the defendants and a statistical average of the cost to fight off
hackers per incident. 3 The court ruled that the plaintiff did not meet its
burden of proving damages.4 In California, the plaintiff has the burden
of showing that the particular defendant caused particular damage with
reasonable certainty in order to recover damages for trespass to chattel. 6
56. 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Ct. App. 1996).
57. Id. at 472-73.
58. Id. at471.
59. See id. at 473.
60. Id. at 473 n.6.




65. See id. The court stated:
We know of no authority-and Thrifty-Tel cites none-suggesting a plaintiff
may satisfy this burden [of proving damages] merely by producing a formula
or figure that in the abstract purports to represent the average damages suffered
as a consequence of similar torts. Indeed, to assess damages based on a
statistical average might be unfair. For example, the facts here indicate the
actual damages resulting from hacking may vary dramatically depending upon
the hacker's method .... Nor can Thrifty-Tel claim actual damages were not
readily calculable: If it is able to determine an average loss for computer
trespass, then surely it is able to produce evidence showing with reasonable
certainty any damages caused by Ryan and Gerry in November 1991.
Id.
1210
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The holding in CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions, Inc.66 is also
relevant to the analysis regarding an action for trespass to chattel in
California.67 In CompuServe, a federal district court held that an online
service provider had established a cause of action for trespass to chattels
against a company that had repeatedly sent unsolicited commercial
electronic mail to its subscribers even after several requests to stop were
made. Cyber Promotions sent millions of unsolicited electronic mail
messages to customers of CompuServe, an Internet service provider.69
CompuServe received numerous complaints from its subscribers about
unsolicited commercial electronic mail sent from the defendant' 0
CompuServe instructed Cyber Promotions on several occasions to stop
sending spam to its customers, but Cyber Promotions refused to honor
this request.7'
The defendants argued that since CompuServe was not physically
dispossessed of its computer system, there was no trespass to chattels."
The court rejected the defendants' argument and followed the Thrifty-Tel
decision.73 The court held that intermeddling with electronic signals via
computer was a "tangible" trespass by Cyber Promotions and thus
interfered with CompuServe's possessory interest in its computer
systems.74 The court further held that a plaintiff could sustain an action
for trespass to chattels without showing that the defendants took
physical custody of the network if the plaintiff could show that the
defendants intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs right to possess
that chattel.7 In that case, Cyber Promotions' refusal to honor the
repeated requests by CompuServe was evidence of its intent to trespass.76
The cause of action for intermeddling with a chattel in the possession
66. 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
67. See id. CompuServe is one of the leading Internet access providers in the
country. Cyber Promotions is one of the leading bulk electronic mail marketing firms.
The president of Cyber Promotions, Sanford Wallace, has adopted the name "Spamford"
Wallace to the protest of the Hormel Corporation. See Hormel Objects to Cyber
Promotions' Use of 'SPAM' Mark, supra note 2.
68. See 962 F. Supp. at 1019-20.
69. See id. at 1018.
70. See id. at 1019.
71. See id. at 1024.
72. See id. at 1020, 1022.
73. See id. at 1021.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 1022.
76. See id. at 1024.
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of another requires evidence of actual damages.? The defendants in
CompuServe argued that, even if they did use CompuServe's network,
their use did not result in physical damage or loss of measurable
economic harm." The Restatement requires harm to the possessor's
materially valuable interest in the physical condition, quality, or value of
the chattel, unless the possessor is deprived of the use for a substantial
period of time.79 The court held that the burden on CompuServe's
computer system to process additional unwanted mall, the cost of trying
to return or stop future mall, and the loss of customer goodwill
represented sufficient tangible damage."0 In California, the Thrifty-Tel
decision is still good law and may require more certainty in proving
quantifiable damages.8
The CompuServe court also rejected the argument made by Cyber
Promotions that CompuServe had consented to the trespass by the very
act of connecting its network to the Internet.2 If the possessor has
consented to the use of the network, the user has a license to use the
chattel within the scope of the consent without liability to the
possessor." Cyber Promotions argued that since CompuServe "made the
business decision to connect to the Internet," the connection in effect
conferred consent of Cyber Promotions to send information to members
connected via the Intemet.4 The analogy used to make the argument
was that of a business establishment inviting the public to enter its
property for business purposes. Although the court conceded that "there
[was] at least a tacit invitation for anyone on the Internet to utilize
plaintiff's computer equipment to send e-mail to its subscribers," the
court emphasized the fact that CompuServe had expressly revoked any
implied consent." The withdrawal of consent can make the original
lawful use into unlawful intermeddling if the party continues to persist in
the use after the termination of the privilege. Therefore, the court
77. See id. at 1022; see also Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468,475
(Ct. App. 1996).
78. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1022-23.
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 218 cmt. d (1965).
80. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1023.
81. See Thrifty-Tel, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475.
82. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1024.
83. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 218 cmt. b (1965).
84. CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1024.
85. Id. at 1023-24. There was a factual dispute as to when notice was given.
However, the court pointed to "clear" records that the defendant was eventually notified
to not send e-mails to CompuServe subscribers. See id. at 1024.
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTS § 217 cmt. f (1965). "The actor may
commit a new trespass by continuing an intermeddling which he has already begun, with
or without the consent of the person in possession. Such intermeddling may persist after
the other's consent, originally given, has been terminated." Id.
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concluded that Cyber Promotions had exceeded any privilege it might
have enjoyed at the onset of the spamming campaign." The court, in
dicta, also noted that a published policy statement that limits
unauthorized sending of unsolicited commercial electronic mail may not
be sufficient to serve as notice."
Finally, the CompuServe court declared that spammers do not have a
constitutional right to send spain to subscribers of Internet service
providers. 9  The court based its logic on the decision in Cyber
Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc." The court in America Online
concluded that Cyber Promotions did not have an "unfettered
[constitutional] right to send unsolicited e-mail advertisements to
subscribers of another private online company over the Internet.'""
Cyber Promotions had argued in that case that they had a constitutional
right to send spain to America Online subscribers because America
Online essentially assumed the role of the state by being the
"postmaster" of the Internet.92 The court in CompuServe declared,
"'[T]he constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only
against abridgment by government ... .""' The constitutional protection
does not extend to private conduct.9 In following America Online, the
court in CompuServe rejected the argument that the Internet service
provider was acting as a quasi-government entity by virtue of the control
of the new medium.95
First, the court in CompuServe stated that the holding in America
Online was that Internet service providers like America Online were
"not exercising powers that are traditionally the exclusive prerogative of
the state, such as where a private company exercises municipal powers
87. See CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1024.
88. See id. CompuServe had a published policy statement that did not permit
sending unsolicited e-mails to its subscribers. See id. The court stated that this notice
"may be insufficiently communicated to potential third-party users when it is merely
posted at some location on the network. However, in the present case the record
indicates that defendants were actually notified that they were using CompuServe's
equipment in an unacceptable manner." Id.
89. See id. at 1025-26.
90. 948 F. Supp. 436,444 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
91. Id. at 437.
92. See id. at 442.
93. CompuServe, 962 . Supp. at 1025 (quoting Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507,
513 (1976)).
94. See id.
95. See id. at 1025-26.
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by running a company town."96 The lack of control was evident in the
finding that consumers had many choices among Internet service
providers.97
Second, the CompuServe court rejected the argument that Cyber
Promotions did not have "adequate alternative means of communication
available to them."9 The court noted that Cyber Promotions could "send
e-mail advertisements to those on the Internet who do not use
CompuServe accounts" and communicate with CompuServe subscribers
"through online bulletin boards, web page advertisements, or facsimile
transmissions, as well as through more conventional means such as the
U.S. mail or telemarketing." 9 The fact that Cyber Promotions may have
to bear a prohibitively high cost for sending spai was deemed irrelevant
by the court. The court stated that "[t]here is no constitutional
requirement that the incremental cost of sending massive quantities of
unsolicited advertisements must be borne by the recipients.""
The legal victories against the largest and most visible bulk e-mail
provider, Cyber Promotions, Inc., have yielded some protection for the
Internet service providers against unsolicited commercial e-mail. It has
effectively put Cyber Promotions out of business.1 'O A recent article
declared that, "the Titanic of the junk e-mail business [Cyber
Promotions] has just met its iceberg."'0 2 However, the "cat and mouse"
game continues because it is difficult for the Internet service providers to
track down the source of unsolicited commercial electronic mail. 3
Also, the sheer number of different spammers has made the task nearly
impossible.'' Finally, even if the Internet service providers could
establish a claim based on trespass to chattels, it is difficult to prove
96. Id. at 1025.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 1026.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. In a major settlement with only one Internet service provider, EarthLink,
Cyber Promotions agreed to pay a $2 million dollar consent judgment. The settlement
also states that if EarthLink catches any Wallace-affiliated company sending junk mail to
EarthLink customers, encouraging others to send such e-mail to Earthlink subscribers,
selling e-mail addresses of EarthLink customers, or even selling software that others may
use to send junk mail to EarthLink subscribers, Wallace may be personally liable for $1
million in damages. See David Loundy, E-Law: Solutions (Slowly) Evolving to Stem
Tide of Junk E-Mail, 3 No. 3 CYBERSPACE LAw. 17 (1998), available in Wesflaw, 3 No.
3 GLCYLAW 17.
102. Id.
103. Spammers often engage in "spoofing" techniques to hide their origin.
Therefore, it is difficult if not impossible for Internet service providers to track down the
spamming party. See Robins, supra note 29.
104. There are literally millions of spams being sent. See generally Wylie, supra
note 5. In fact, AOL says that spain accounts for 30% of their total e-mail activity. See
id.
1214
[VOL. 37: 1201,2000] Unsolicited Electronic Mail
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
actual damages since the plaintiff must show that a particular defendant
caused specific damages." 5
IV. UNSOLICITED COMMERCIAL ELECTRONIC MAIL
LEGISLATION IN CALIFORNIA
The frustration felt by Internet users has not been lost on the
legislature.' °  Several states have passed or are considering passing
legislation to regulate or ban unsolicited commercial electronic mail."'7
The Congress of the United States is also considering different
variations of anti-spain legislation.""3
A. Electronic Mail and the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
The notion of regulating unsolicited commercial advertisements is not
entirely new. Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
in 1991 '09 in response to "abuses by the telemarketing industry.""0 This
legislation banned the use of any telephone facsimile machine,
computer, or other device to send an unsolicited advertisement via a
telephone facsimile machine."' Unsolicited fax advertisements are
105. California requires particular damages. See Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54
Cal. Rptr. 2d 468,475 (Ct. App. 1996).
106. Interestingly, although most people detest spare and feel that it should be
regulated, 74% of surveyed Internet users felt that the Internet service providers should
regulate spare, while only 15% believed that federal, state, or local government should
get involved. See GartnerGroup Benchmarks the State of Spain, supra note 3.
107. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.45 (West 1998 & Supp. 2000). Authors
of the bill A.B. No. 1629 were Miller (R) and Cunneen (R); this Bill was read a third
time and passed in the State Assembly with 38 Ayes and 0 Noes on August 26, 1998.
See AB 1629 Assembly Bill: History (visited July 11, 2000) <http:llwww.leginfo.ca.gov/
pub/97-98/billlasm/ab_1601-1650/ab_1629_bilLhistory.html>. The bill was approved
and signed by Governor Wilson on September 26, 1998. See id. Delaware is
considering making unsolicited commercial e-mail unlawful unless it has been requested
by the recipient. See S.B. 138, 140th Gen. Assembly (Del. 1999). Illinois is considering
making unsolicited commercial e-mails a Class C misdemeanor. See H.B. 2718, 91st
Gen. Assembly (Ii. 1999).
108. There are several bills in both houses of Congress. See S. 759, 106th Cong.
(1999); S. 699, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1910, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1685, 106th
Cong. (1999); H.R. 2162, 106th Cong. (1999).
109. 47 U.S.C. § 227 (1994).
110. David E. Sorkin, Unsolicited Commercial E-Mail and the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 45 BuFF. L. REv. 1001, 1001 (1997).
111. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C) ("It shall be unlawful for any person within the
United States... to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device to
send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine ... ").
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strikingly similar to spare. Both unsolicited faxes and electronic mails
are inconveniences, and both impose a monetary burden on the
recipient.' 2 One difference is that unsolicited fax advertising ties up the
recipient's fax machine, making it impossible to receive other faxes,
while electronic mail does not."'
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 was most likely not
intended to regulate unsolicited commercial e-mail."4  In defining the
term "telephone facsimile machine" to mean "equipment which has the
capacity (A) to transcribe text or images, or both, from paper into an
electronic signal and to transmit that signal over a regular telephone line,
or (B) to transcribe text or images (or both) from an electronic signal
received over a regular telephone line onto paper," Congress may have
inadvertently included sparn in the Telephone Consumer Protection
Act." 5 In an ironic twist, an individual sued CompuServe (the Internet
service provider that sued Cyber Promotions in CompuServe v. Cyber
Promotions,"6 the leading case against unsolicited commercial electronic
mail) under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act for two unsolicited
electronic mails CompuServe sent to him."'
112. See Sorkin, supra note 110, at 1008. The sender of a fax usually pays "for the
telephone call to the recipient's fax machine." Id. The recipient of a fax generally has to
pay for the cost to transfer the digital data into a hard copy. See id. Typically, the costs
associated with the transfer include paper, ink or toner, and maintenance of the
machines, as well as the cost of maintaining a dedicated telephone line to receive faxes.
See id. It costs the recipient between 4 and 12 cents to receive one page of fax. See id.
at 1009. The cost of unsolicited commercial electronic mail is also split between the
recipient and the sender. See id. at 1010. However, it is much easier to send much larger
quantities of unsolicited advertisements by electronic mail than by fax. See id. It is,
therefore, much easier to send larger quantities of advertisement at a lower price.
Unsolicited commercial electronic mail may place a much greater burden upon recipients
than unsolicited fax transmissions because the recipient will get many more electronic
mail advertisements. See id. at 1012.
113. See id. at 1011. Unsolicited commercial electronic mails do not have the same
problem. Multiple electronic mails can be received simultaneously. See id. However,
the recipient's telephone line may be tied up extensively when one is forced to download
unsolicited commercial electronic mails. See id. Further, unlike fax transmissions, span
is typically stored in the disk space of the recipient's provider of Internet service. Unlike
telephone companies, which are directly compensated by the advertiser to carry their
advertisement, the Internet service providers are not paid for the use of their network by
spammers. See id.
114. See id. at 1012-20.
115. 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(2) (1994). A personal computer with a standard modem
and printer would qualify under the plain meaning of the statute. As a result, some
commentators have argued that unsolicited commercial electronic mail is illegal under
the Telephone Consumer Protection Act. See Sorkin, supra note 110, at 1013.
116. 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
117. See Sorkin, supra note 110, at 1002 n.12.
Section 227(b)(3)(B) of the TCPA provides for statutory damages of $500 for
each violation. Robert Arkow of California filed a small claims action against
CompuServe in February 1995 based upon this provision, seeking $1,000 in
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A detailed statutory construction of the language and history of the
Act, however, suggests that unsolicited electronic mails are not included
in the act."'
The Telephone Consumer Protection Act may still be significant in
one respect: Congress is now considering various modifications to the
act to explicitly include unsolicited commercial electronic mails.
B. California's Statutes on Unsolicited Commercial Electronic Mail
State legislatures have responded to the problem of unsolicited
commercial electronic mail with a vengeance; California has adopted
two statutes specifically aimed at curbing unsolicited commercial
electronic mail."9 Section 17538.4 of the California Business and
Professions Code deals with all unsolicited commercial electronic
mail,20 and section 17538.45 specifically addresses instances where the
registered user of an Internet service provider sends unsolicited
commercial electronic mail.12 ' To understand the law in California
regarding unsolicited e-mail, both statutes must be examined.
Section 17538.4 of the California Business and Professions Code
regulates the sending of all unsolicited electronic mail.'22 The statute
defines unsolicited electronic mail as a "document or documents
consisting of advertising material for the lease, sale, rental, gift offer, or
other disposition of any realty, goods, services, or extension of credit"'"
where the "initiator does not have an existing business or personal
relationship"'2 4 and the "documents are not sent at the request of, or with
the express consent of, the recipient.""' It also requires that all
unsolicited advertising material must "include 'ADV:' as the first four
statutory damages for two unsolicited e-mail advertisements he received from
CompuServe, and an additional $1,000 in punitive damages based upon his
claim that he had previously notified CompuServe of his desire not to receive
such messages. The parties settled under undisclosed terms.
Id.
118. See id. at 1012-16.
119. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17538.4, 17538.45 (West 1997 & Supp.
2000).
120. Id. § 17538.4.
121. Id. § 17538.45.
122. Id. § 17538.4.
123. Id. § 17538.4(e).
124. Id. § 17538.4(e)(1).
125. Id. § 17538.4(e)(2).
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characters" in the subject heading of the electronic mail.'2 In addition,
the statute prohibits a person or entity from sending unsolicited
electronic mail unless the sender "establishes a toll free telephone
number or valid sender operated" electronic mail address so "that the
recipient... may call or [write an electronic mail] notify[ing] the sender
not to e-mail any further unsolicited documents."' 27 Notice of the toll
number must be the first text attached in the body of the message. 
12
Finally, "[u]pon notification by a recipient of his or her request not to
receive any further unsolicited" electronic mail, the sender must not
cause to be sent any unsolicited electronic mail to that recipient. 129
Violation of this section is a misdemeanor.
130
Section 17538.45 of the California Business and Professions Code
regulates the sending of all unsolicited electronic mail.' Electronic
mail advertisement is defined as "any electronic mail message, the
principal purpose of which is to promote, directly or indirectly, the sale
or other distribution of goods or services to the recipient. '1 2 It prohibits
registered users33 from sending unsolicited commercial electronic mail
to a recipient with whom he does not have an existing business or
personal relationship and when it is not sent at the request of or with the
express consent of the recipient."' The new law also allows Internet
service providers to recover the greater of the actual monetary loss
suffered by the violation of the statute or $50 in "liquidated damages"
for each mail message initiated, with a maximum of $25,000,"' so long
as the defendant had notice of the Internet service provider's policy
barring electronic mail advertising.'36 Also, the spain must have actually
used the electronic mail service provider's equipment located in
California.'37
126. Id. § 17538.4(g).
127. Id. § 17538.4(a)(2).
128. See id. § 17538.4(b).
129. Id. § 17538.4(c).
130. See id. § 17538(f); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 19 (West 1999) (stating that
the punishment for a misdemeanor is six months in county jail, $1000, or both).
131. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.45.
132. Id. § 17538.45(a)(1).
133. The statute makes a distinction between registered and non-registered users.
See id. § 17538.45(a)(5). Registered users are defined as "any individual, corporation, or
other entity that maintains [an account] with an electronic mail service provider." Id.
134. See id. § 17538.45.
135. See id. § 17538.9(f)(1).
136. See id. § 17538.9(f)(3)(A).
137. See id. § 17538.45(f).
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V. ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA'S STATUTES ON UNSOLICITED
COMMERCIAL ELECTRONIC MAIL
Sections 17538.4 and 17538.45 of the California Business and
Professions Code clearly affect the sending of unsolicited commercial
electronic mail.13 Depending upon whether one is a recipient or an
Internet service provider and whether there is a contractual relationship
between the parties, the remedies and causes of action can be
significantly different. The statutes also significantly change the
consequences of sending unsolicited commercial electronic mail.
A. Where Sender Does Not Have a Contractual Relationship
with the Internet Service Provider
One significant aspect of section 17538.4 of the California Business
and Professions Code is that it imposes several duties on the sender of
unsolicited commercial electronic mail, such as requiring the sender to
identify the nature of the mail in the subject heading and to clearly
identify the sender with a toll free number or return address.'39 One
impact of compliance with the subject heading requirement will be to
alert the recipient that they are receiving unsolicited commercial
electronic mail.' 4 A direct consequence of requiring the sender to
clearly identify a return address is that it prohibits employing "spoofing"
techniques to hide one's address.'
41
However, section 17538.4 fails to resolve many of the problems
associated with unsolicited commercial electronic mail. First, it does not
prevent the initial harm suffered by the recipient and requires active
effort by the recipient to be taken off the list.142 Second, even if the
138. Id. §§ 17538.4, 17538.45.
139. See id. § 17538.4(b).
140. Of course, this assumes that people will eventually learn of its significance.
141. Currently, these spoofing techniques can prohibit the recipient from knowing
the origin of the electronic mail. See Robins, supra note 29.
142. Many of the new electronic mail retrieval programs come with built-in
screening software to block unsolicited electronic mail. For example, Microsoft Outlook
Express 4 and 5 have features that allow the user to block the receipt of mail from a
particular sender or with a particular subject. See Bedell, supra note 11. However, it is
unclear that a typical Internet user knows of the availability of this feature. Further, it is
likely that non-savvy computer users may require technical assistance to program the
software to effectively block out unsolicited electronic mail. For those that are using
older versions of electronic mail retrieval software, they may be required to purchase or
download a free version of the latest software with spam blocking features. Even the
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recipient notifies the sender, it does not guarantee that the recipient will
no longer receive unsolicited commercial electronic mail. This section
also does not protect the rights of Internet service providers who suffer
damages and may actually be in the best position to stop unsolicited
commercial electronic mail. Finally, the statute fails to supply a strong
civil remedy for Internet users.
Section 17538.4 has a limited impact because it does not prevent the
initial harm suffered by the recipient and requires an active effort by the
recipient to be taken off the list. The economic cost of sorting through
and deleting unsolicited commercial electronic mail is significant.'43
Although requiring the use of "ADV:"'44 in the subject heading may
reduce the time it takes to identify the spam, the recipient will still be
forced to download the mail before he or she can delete the file.'45
Further, placing the burden on the recipient to identify the span and to
call a toll free number or write a reply letter to the sender could add to
the loss in productivity when dealing with unsolicited commercial
electronic mail.'
Notification by the sender does not guarantee that the recipient will no
longer receive unsolicited commercial electronic mail. Even if all
spammers comply with section 17538.4, it would mean that the
notification would only remove the recipient from the mailing list of a
particular sender. There are literally tens of thousands of different
mailers selling tens of thousands of products employing spam. 47 It is
therefore possible to reply to hundreds of items of unsolicited
commercial electronic mail and still get more spam. Further, many
spammers currently exploit the recipient's request to be taken off a
mailing list by sending more unsolicited commercial electronic mail to
the recipient.' Therefore, many recipients receiving unwanted
electronic mail may follow the advice of spam experts and not reply at
wide availability and use of screening software by users do not shift the cost of span
from the recipient to the sender. The time and cost of learning of the availability of the
software, using the software, and possibly purchasing and downloading new software are
all borne by Internet users rather than the spamming party.
143. See Brown, supra note 12.
144. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.4(g).
145. This assumes that the recipient is not using screening software to block out
unsolicited commercial electronic mail.
146. See generally Brown, supra note 12 (discussing economic consequences of
spam).
147. See generally Bedell, supra note 11 (discussing some negative ramifications of
battering spammers). There are several organizations, such as www.spamfree.org,
www.junkbusters.com, and www.cauce.org that will assist consumers in getting their
name removed from mass mailing lists. While these organizations can assist consumers,
compliance with those requests is only voluntary. See Stanley A. Miller II, Taking Aim
at Span, MILWAUKEEJ. SENTINEL, May 11, 1999, at IM.
148. See Bedell, supra note 11.
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all.
149
Additionally, section 17538.4 does not protect the rights of Internet
service providers who also suffer damages' 0 and who may actually be in
the best position to stop unsolicited commercial electronic mail. The
Internet service providers have a right to prevent unauthorized access to
their network by spammers.'5' Also, section 17528.4 creates no
additional remedies for Internet service providers. The legislation
explicitly imposes an affirmative duty on the recipient to notify the
sender to be taken off the mailing list. 2 While it can be argued that the
Internet service providers are also "recipients" or agents of the recipients
and, therefore, have the power to give notice to the spamming party, the
construction of the statute strongly suggests that the legislature only
intended to grant individual recipients a remedy.
First, the statute identifies the recipient's notice as "his or her request"
suggesting that the request be made by an individual rather than an
entity.'53 Second, the statute specifically refers to the role of the Internet
service provider as "merely carr[ying the] transmission over its network"
suggesting that the Internet service provider is not the recipient of the
mail.'-4 Third, the right of Internet service providers to limit spamming
activity by registered users is expressly listed in section 17538.45 but is
not mentioned in section 17538.4 for non-registered users. Finally,
section 17538.5 specifically allows employers to notify the sender of
unsolicited commercial electronic mail on behalf of all its employees but
does not mention similar rights for Internet service providers.'5
The Internet service provider is in the best position to stop unsolicited
commercial electronic mail. As a carrier of electronic data, the Internet
service provider would have access to the unsolicited electronic mail
before the individual recipient, thus giving it an ability to delete the file
first. It also has greater capability and resources to detect unsolicited
electronic mail. The addition of "ADV:" in the subject heading would
make it easier for the Internet service providers to screen out unsolicited
junk mail, but an unwary individual recipient may not be informed of the
149. See id.
150. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.4 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
151. See CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1017 (S.D.
Ohio 1997).
152. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.4(b).
153. Id. § 17538.4(c).
154. Id. § 17538.4(0.
155. Id. § 17538.4(h).
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significance of the "ADV:" heading. Also, giving Internet service
providers the ability to notify the sender on behalf of individual
recipients would be a more efficient means of stopping unsolicited
electronic mail. For example, if one spammer sends one million
unsolicited commercial electronic mails to individual recipients, the
statute would require that one million people respond and give notice to
the spammer to take them off the particular mailing list. If the Internet
service provider had the power to give notice, it could send one reply on
behalf of the million subscribers. Finally, the Internet service providers
have more financial resources than the typical subscriber to seek legal
recourse for any violation of the statute.'56
Finally, the statute fails to supply strong penalties for violations of
section 17538.4. Violation of any provision of section 17538.4 is a
misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not
exceeding six months, by a fine not exceeding $1000, or by both
imprisonment and fine.'57 Making the violation a misdemeanor does not
preclude civil remedies.'58
The penalty for the violation seems to have been "watered down."
Historical notes indicate that the original statute would have made the
act of continuing to send unsolicited electronic mail after notification
"punishable by a fine of $500 for each and every transmission."'59 The
original statute would have had a stronger deterrent effect in that each
and every transmission would have multiplied the penalty, thus giving
the spammer a stronger economic incentive not to violate the law. The
legislation also does not give individual recipients or the Internet service
providers a statutory basis for recovering punitive damages from
spammers for violations.
B. Where Sender Does Have a Contractual Relationship
with the Internet Service Provider
Section 17538.45 of the California Business and Professions Code
deals with Internet service providers' rights and remedies against
"unsolicited electronic mail advertisements [sent] by registered
user[s].*' '  Registered users are those that maintain a contractual
156. This is assuming that, since Internet service providers are businesses, they
generally have greater resources than the typical individual subscriber.
157. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538(t); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 19
(West 1999) (describing the punishment for a misdemeanor).
158. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17534.5.
159. Id. § 17538.4, Historical and Statutory Notes, 1998 Legislation, 17538.4(d)
(West Supp. 2000); see also CAL. PENAL CODE § 19 (West 1999) (describing the
punishment for a misdemeanor).
160. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.45 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
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relationship with the Internet service provider."' Registered users
sending unsolicited commercial electronic mail must, therefore, comply
with both section 17538.4 and section 17835.45.
Internet service providers are granted several rights under section
17835.45. The most significant of these rights is the ability to seek civil
"liquidated damages" from the registered users.62  The liquidated
damages provision is significant because it changes the common law as
well as the statutory law governing contracts.
Legislative history indicates that the liquidated damages clause was
intended to make it easier to satisfy the particular damage requirement of
the common law. The author of the California spamn legislation claims,
"that courts around the country have recognized that ISP's [Internet
service providers] have a cognizable property interest in their equipment
and service" but that "existing legal remedies for ISP's to control the use
of their network are inadequate because it is virtually impossible for
them to calculate their actual losses or damages from mass-distributed
unsolicited e-mail ads."' 63
California courts have consistently limited plaintiffs' recovery on a
cause of action based on trespass to chattel to the specific and particular
harm caused by the defendant.'64 Unlike other torts, such as conversion,
which require substantial deprivation of the possessory interest in the
chattel, an action for trespass to chattel can be maintained for intentional
intermeddling of the chattel.'65 For example, if a person steals an
owner's car, the owner can sue on conversion because the owner is
substantially deprived of the use of his possessory interest in the car.
However, if a person intentionally brushes a car, the owner may not have
a claim based on conversion because the person did not substantially
deprive the owner of his possession or use of the car.
The owner may have a remedy for trespass to chattel, however,
because the person intentionally interfered with his chattel. Unlike
conversion, measuring damages for trespass to chattel is more uncertain
and can result in a windfall for the plaintiff. California courts are,
therefore, reluctant to grant damages for trespass to chattel absent proof
that the defendant caused specific and particular harm to the plaintiff,
161. See id. § 17538.45(5).
162. See id. § 17538.45(0(1).
163. Electronic Mail: Hearing on AB 1629 Before the Senate Floor (Cal. 1998)
(California Committee Analysis) [hereinafter Electronic Mail].
164. See Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468,473 (Ct. App. 1996)
165. See id. at 475.
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even if the acts of the defendant were fraudulent or illegal.' 6 A showing
of statistical evidence or hours spent on tracking down the particular
defendant is not enough to show damages.'67
Section 17538.45 of the California Business and Professions Code
changes the common law by disposing of the particularity of damages
requirement.6 The statute now provides:
In addition to any other action available under law, any [Internet service
provider] ... may bring a civil action to recover the actual monetary loss
suffered by that provider by reason of that violation, or liquidated damages of
$50 for each electronic mail message initiated or delivered in violation of this
section, up to a maximum of $25,000 per day, whichever amount is greater.'o
Therefore, it greatly reduces the burden on the Internet service providers
to prove civil damages and increases the likelihood of recovery in suits
that would have been difficult, if not impossible, to win under the
common law.
For example, assume that a registered user of a particular Internet
service provider sends one hundred random unsolicited commercial
electronic mails to subscribers of that Internet service provider in the
hope of selling widgets. Under the common law, the Internet service
provider will have to prove that the additional one hundred electronic
mails caused particular damage to the Internet service provider.70
Proving damages would be difficult because the quantity of mail was so
negligible that it would be hard to prove specific and particular damages
as a result of the one hundred electronic mails.' Even under the more
relaxed CompuServe standard, it would be difficult to prove damages as
a result of loss of "goodwill" by the individual subscribers.'
Section 17538.45 also arbitrarily discriminates between registered and
non-registered users. The requirement of a "registered" user determines
the ability to gain statutory damages, whereas the common law does not.
The Internet service provider would be able to recover damages from the
registered user even if the unsolicited electronic mail is sent to non-
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See Cal. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.45 (1997 & Supp. 2000).
169. Id. § 17538.45(f)(1).
170. See Thrifty-Tel, Inc., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 475.
171. See generally Electronic Mail, supra note 163.
172. CompuServe v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
Assume that none of the one hundred recipients who received the electronic mail
complained or switched Internet service providers. See id. at 1027 ("Defendants'
intentional use of plaintiff's proprietary computer equipment exceeds plaintiff's consent
and, indeed, continued after repeated demands that defendants cease." (emphasis
added)).
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subscribers of the Internet service provider. In order to have a claim
against the registered user, the statute only requires that the registered
user be notified of its policy against unsolicited commercial electronic
mail and that the registered user "use or cause to be used that electronic
mail service provider's equipment" located in this state."'
73
For example, say that a registered user of X Internet service provider
sends one hundred unsolicited electronic mails advertising widgets to
one hundred subscribers of Y Internet service provider. Assume that X
Internet service provider cannot attribute a particular harm to the one
hundred additional electronic mails because the volume is so low.
Assume also that Y Internet service provider receives several complaints
about the electronic mail. Under section 17538.45 of the California
Business and Professions Code, X Internet service provider may seek
$5000 in damages, whereas Y would not have a statutory basis to recover
damages from the spammer because he is not a registered user.
Registered users are defined as "any individual, corporation, or other
entity that maintains an electronic mail address with an electronic mail
service provider."'7 Since the spammer does not maintain an electronic
mail address with Y Internet service provider, the Y Internet service
provider will have to rely on the common law and must prove actual and
particular damages. The results are different from the common law
because the statutory damages may not be in proportion to actual
damages. In this example, Y Internet service provider may have suffered
greater damages than X Internet service provider, but satisfying the
registered user requirement may mean that X Internet service provider
may ultimately recover more in damages.
The liquidated damages provision is also significant because it
changes the statutory law governing the law of contracts. Section
17538.45 seems to give Internet service providers damages that they
would otherwise not be able to get from subscribers under pre-existing
California contract law. Under section 1671 of the California Civil
Code, "a provision in a contract liquidating the damages for the breach
of the contract is valid unless the party seeking to invalidate the
provision establishes that the provision was unreasonable under the
circumstances existing at the time the contract was made."' 75 It also
states that the "section does not apply in any case where another statute
173. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.45(b).
174. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.45(a)(5).
175. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1671(b) (West 1985).
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expressly I. "prescribes... liquidating the damages for the breach of the
contract." Therefore, section 17538.45 of the California Business and
Professions Code escapes the usual limitations on liquidated damages
under section 1671 of the California Civil Code, because section
17538.45 expressly prescribes liquidated damages.
First and foremost, in order for the liquidated damages to survive
judicial scrutiny under section 1671 of the California Civil Code, there
has to be a contract specifying liquidated damages.' Section 1671
specifically refers to a "provision in a contract" for liquidated
damages.' Black's Law Dictionary defines liquidated damages as "the
sum which [a] party to [a] contract agrees to pay if he breaks some
promise and, which having been arrived at by good faith effort to
estimate actual damage that will probably ensue from breach, is
recoverable as agreed damages if breach occurs."'79 Section 17538.45 of
the California Business and Professions Code allows for recovery of $50
in liquidated damages without the requirement that the registered user
expressly promise to pay the liquidated damages in case of a breach.
Internet service providers may be entitled to liquidated damages if they
prove that they notified the registered user of their general policy against
spamming and that the registered user in fact sent unsolicited
commercial electronic mail in violation of that policy.8 There is no
requirement that the Internet service provider modify the contract with
the registered user to reflect the liquidated damages provision since the
liquidated damages are statutory.
The liquidated damages provision would probably not survive the
challenge that it was unreasonable under the circumstances existing at
the time the contract was made. In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v.
Board of Trustees,'8 ' the California Court of Appeal cited section 1671
of the California Civil Code and ruled that "[1]iquidated damages are a
penalty not favored in equity and should be enforced only after he who
seeks to enforce them has shown that he has strictly complied with the
contractual requisite to such enforcement.""'
In Greenbach Brothers, Inc., v. Bums,' the California Court of
Appeal examined the difference between invalid penalty clauses and
liquidated damages provisions by examining the proportion of the
176. Id. § 1671(a).
177. See id. § 1671(b).
178. See id.
179. BLACK'S LAW DIcTiONARY 391 (6th ed. 1990).
180. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.45 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
181. 35 Cal. Rptr. 765 (Ct. App. 1963).
182. Id. at 767 (emphasis omitted).
183. 54 Cal. Rptr. 143 (Ct. App. 1966).
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money in relation to actual damages.' The court noted that what
"distinguishes a provision for liquidated damages from one that is in the
nature of a penalty" is that the "characteristic feature of a penalty is its
lack of ay proportionate relation to actual damages that may arise upon
breach." 8
Even assuming that Internet service providers include the $50
damages in all new contracts, the figure seems excessive and
unreasonable. The $50 minimum statutory damage award per offending
electronic mail message does not mirror the actual damages suffered by
the Internet service provider. In the hypothetical described in Part V.A'!6
regarding one hundred unsolicited electronic mails to sell widgets, the
Internet service provider could hardly argue that it suffered $5000 in
damages. Actual damages suffered by Internet service providers are real
and significant.' However, $50 per offending electronic mail does not
bear a proportionate relation to actual damages that may arise upon
breach. If we assume that unsolicited electronic mail totals 10% of all
electronic mail sent, then there are approximately 80.3 trillion
unsolicited commercial electronic mail messages sent yearly.'
In order to justify the $50 in liquidated damages per electronic mail,
the Internet service industry must somehow come close to suffering
$4.015 quadrillion a year in losses attributable to span activity. Of
course, this figure is not proportional to the actual loss suffered by the
industry. America Online, the largest Internet service provider, has a
total market valuation of a little over $162 billion.' The Internet
service providers themselves attribute the total cost borne by the
industry at about 10% of revenues.'"
184. See id. at 147.
185. Id.
186. Assume that a registered user of X Internet service provider sends one hundred
unsolicited electronic mail messages advertising widgets to one hundred subscribers of Y
Internet service provider. X Internet service provider cannot attribute a particular harm
to the one hundred additional electronic mails because the volume is so low. Assume
also that Y Internet service provider receives several complaints about the electronic
mail.
187. See Wylie, supra note 5.
188. See Stroh, supra note 6.
189. See Frederick F. Jespersen, Making the Most of a Good Situation, Bus. WK.,
Dec. 27, 1999, at 168, 194.
190. See Wylie, supra note 5.
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VI. PROPOSED REVISION OF THE CALIFORNIA STATUTES
The economic damage suffered by both the recipients and the Internet
service providers as a result of unsolicited commercial electronic mail is
significant.'' For recipients and Internet service providers to bear the
cost of receiving unwanted mail is against public policy and should be
remedied. The common law may not be well suited or adequate to deal
with the problem because it demands that the plaintiff prove a
particularized damage, whereas the Internet service providers can show
only cumulative damages as a result of unsolicited electronic mail.
California's two statutes dealing with the problem of unsolicited
commercial electronic mail also fall short of relieving the problem.
9 2
First, the statutes tolerate the vast majority of unsolicited commercial
electronic mail. For example, the statutes would have had no bearing on
CompuServe's suit against Cyber Promotions had the statute been in
effect at that time because the parties were not in privity of contract. 94
These two statutes seem to have been drawn hastily as interim measures
to deal with unsolicited commercial electronic mail until federal
legislation is enacted. 95 This may partly explain why the statutes seem
unable to effectively promote the public policy of reducing unwanted
spam and to discriminate fairly between senders of spam.
In analyzing California's statutes regulating unsolicited commercial
electronic mail, the following revisions should further the public policy
goals of minimizing the harm caused as a result of receiving unsolicited
commercial electronic mail and getting rid of unnecessary and unfair
discrimination between registered and non-registered senders of spain.
First, section 17538.4 of the California Business and Professions Code
should allow Internet service providers, with the consent of the
registered recipient, to give notice to the sender on behalf of the
recipient of unsolicited commercial electronic mail. In the alternative,
the law could prohibit any unsolicited commercial electronic mail
without a prior business or professional relationship or without express
191. See id.
192. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17538.4, 17538.45 (West 1997 & Supp.
2000).
193. See CompuServe Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015 (S.D. Ohio
1997).
194. See id. at 1028.
195. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.4. The statute specifically states that it
will become inoperative as soon as a federal law is enacted. See id. § 17538.4(i) (Supp.
2000). Due to the limited scope of this Comment, the discussion of possible
constitutional issues arising out of the interstate commerce clause has been intentionally
excluded. See generally David T. Bartels, Recent Legislation, Canning Spam:
California Bans Unsolicited Commercial E-mail, 30 McGEORGE L. REv. 420 (1999)
(discussing constitutional issues).
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consent of the recipient similar to the federal anti-fax legislation.
Second, civil punitive damages should be available to both the recipient
and the Internet service provider for violations of the statute. Finally,
section 17538.45 of the California Business and Professions Code
should be repealed.
The biggest problem with section 17538.4 of the California Business
and Professions Code is that it tolerates the vast majority of unwanted
and unsolicited electronic mail and places the burden of being removed
from the mailing list on the recipient. For example, the statute would do
little to address the problem involved in CompuServe v. Cyber
Promotions.'96 In that case, Cyber Promotions sent out huge volumes of
unsolicited electronic mail to subscribers of CompuServe.'" Several
subscribers responded to Cyber Promotions directly, but millions of
unsolicited electronic mail messages were sent and would continue to be
sent unless all of the individual subscribers individually requested that
they be removed.' 8 By granting CompuServe the right to notify Cyber
Promotions under the statute, millions of repetitive and unnecessary
electronic mail messages notifying the sender would not be necessary.
CompuServe should be required to get consent of the subscribers, but
this can be readily accomplished with a revision of their service
agreement.
In the alternative, the statute should prohibit any unsolicited
commercial electronic mail without a prior business or professional
relationship or without express consent of the recipient, as was done
with unsolicited electronic faxes by federal law.'9 This revision would
basically put the same prohibition imposed on registered users on non-
registered users. The benefit of the second approach is that it will reduce
the multiple spammer problem. For example, if there are ten thousand
spammers sending out one million electronic mail messages to the same
subscribers of an Internet service provider, the first suggested revision
approach would require that the Internet service provider send out ten
thousand notices. The flat prohibition on unsolicited commercial
electronic mail would avoid the burden of the notice requirement on the
Internet service provider. However, the burdens of receiving unsolicited
196. 962 F. Supp. 1015. Cyber Promotions received notice only from CompuServe
rather than from millions of individual subscribers. See id. at 1017. Also, Cyber
Promotions did not have a contractual relationship with CompuServe. See id.
197. See id. at 1017.
198. See id. at 1023.
199. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b) (1994).
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electronic faxes and unsolicited electronic mail are not the same.M The
legislature should consider whether a complete ban would be preferred
over a severe restriction on this emerging technology.
The second revision to the statute should be to allow civil punitive
damages for both the recipient and the Internet service provider. The
Thrifty-Tel2f ' requirement of proving a particular harm by a particular act
of the defendant may be difficult if not impossible to prove.22 The
legislature imprudently watered down the original language of the
statute and eliminated the $500 in penalties per transmission.203 Since
both the recipient and the Internet service provider suffer the harm or
damage, and the damage is difficult to prove for both parties, the statute
should be revised both to compensate the victims and to deter sending
unsolicited commercial electronic mail in violation of the statute.2°4
Finally, section 17538.45 of the California Business and Professions
Code should be repealed. The legislature intended the legislation to
allow easier compensation for Internet service providers. 5 However, it
probably will not deter prolific spammers, such as Cyber Promotions,
and would be unfair to unsuspecting registered users who may engage in
some commerce that the legislature may not have intended to prohibit.2'
Prolific spammers can avoid paying any liquidated damages so long as
they do not send unsolicited electronic mail to the same subscribers of
their own Internet service provider.20' For example, if they want to target
the largest Internet service provider, America Online, °8 they merely have
to sign up with a different Internet service provider and escape the
statutory liquidated damages. Discriminating in this fashion is neither
warranted nor effective. It also seems unfair to impose the liquidated
damages provision to a contract without mentioning the damages and
200. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
201. See Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468,475 (Ct. App. 1996).
202. See id.
203. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.4, Historical and Statutory Notes, 1998
Legislation, 17538.4(d) (West Supp. 2000).
204. Although the current statute offers some deterrence against the sending of
span with a misdemeanor penalty, it offers no easy vehicle for victims to seek damages.
205. See Electronic Mal, supra note 163.
206. A consumer sending a few electronic mail messages to members of a
discussion group may be liable to Internet service providers. For example, a person
trying to sell an airplane ticket that he cannot use may decide to send a few electronic
mails to a discussion group about European travel.
207. All the spamming party must do is to not be a registered user of a particular
Internet service provider. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538.45(a)(5) (West 1997 &
Supp. 2000).
208. See Jespersen, supra note 189.
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without the consent of both parties.20 The legislature should dispense
with the liquidated damages language and impose statutory penalties for
sending unsolicited commercial electronic mail.
If the legislature incorporates these recommendations, it will
accomplish the goal of minimizing the harm caused by unsolicited
commercial electronic mail to both consumers and Internet service
providers by decreasing or eliminating unsolicited commercial electronic
mail. The suggested punitive damages should also provide an effective
remedy to deter senders, and compensate victims, of unsolicited
commercial electronic mail. While the growth and emergence of the
Internet and electronic mail should not be hindered by legislation, the
shiffing of costs and burdens onto consumers and Internet service
providers by aggressive marketers should not be tolerated.
CALVIN WHANG
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209. There is no requirement that the Internet service provider notify the registered
user of the statutory liquidated damages amount See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
17538.45.
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